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REVISED ARTICLE 9 OF THE UCC: SCOPE,
PERFECTION, PRIORITIES, AND
DEFAULT*
BARKLEY CLARKt
I. BROADENED SCOPE OF REVISED ARTICLE 9
Revised Article 9 continues to apply to transactions, re-
gardless of form, that create a security interest in personal prop-
erty or fixtures by contract. Rev. UCC § 9-109(a). It continues to
exclude: landlord's liens; nonagricultural statutory liens; wage
assignments; sales of intangibles as part of a sale of the business
out of which they arose; assignments of receivables for the pur-
pose of collection only; assignments of receivables in full or par-
tial satisfaction of prior debt; interests in insurance policies other
than health care receivables; assignments of rights represented by
a judgment; setoff; real-property liens; and assignments of tort
claims other than commercial tort claims. Rev. UCC § 9-109(d).
Revised Article 9 does not apply to the extent that a statute, regu-
lation, or treaty of the United States preempts it; this does not
mean that Article 9 bows out just because a federal law covers
some aspects of the transaction, as some cases under current law
suggest. See Rev. UCC § 9-109(c)(1) and Comment 8.
The basic scope of Article 9-coverage of consensual secu-
rity interests in personal property and fixtures -remains intact.
As under current law, the application of Revised Article 9 to a
security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact
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that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to
which Article 9 does not apply. Rev. UCC § 9-109(b). Comment 7
to Rev. UCC § 9-109 gives the example of a security interest in a
promissory note that is itself secured by real estate. Under the
revision, if the note is perfected under Article 9 (probably by pos-
session) and the underlying mortgage is perfected under real es-
tate law, perfection of a security interest in the note automatically
carries over to the real estate, without the necessity of any re-
corded assignment of the mortgage. Conversely, one cannot ob-
tain a security interest in the underlying real estate mortgage
without an effective security interest in the note secured by the
mortgage. On this last point, the revision rejects cases decided
under current law like In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp.'
In a fine-tuning of current law, Rev. UCC § 9-109(a) pro-
vides that Article 9 applies to:
* Any transaction that creates a security interest
in personal property or fixtures by contract
(same as current law)
* An agricultural lien (a major change in the law,
since the lien is created by statute rather than
by contract)
* A sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment in-
tangibles, or promissory notes (the last two
categories are new)
* A consignment (same as current law, with
some changes)
* Security interests arising under other parts of
the UCC (same as current law)
1. See In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp., 743 F2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984), clari-
fied on reconsideration, 760 F2d 119 (1985).
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Although security interests generally must be consensual
to fall within the scope of Article 9, the revision includes one im-
portant nonconsensual interest: statutory agricultural liens.
Moreover, the revision expands the scope of Article 9 in several
other important respects. This should bring more transactions
out of the murky realm of common law liens and into the more
predictable framework of the UCC. Several of the expansions are
intended to facilitate securitization. Following are the most im-
portant expansions of scope brought about by the revision.
A. Outright Sales of Accounts, Promissory Notes, Chattel Paper,
and Payment Intangibles
Current Article 9 covers outright sales of accounts and
chattel paper, but not any other type of collateral. UCC § 9-
102(1)(b). The revision covers outright sales of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Rev. UCC § 9-
109(a)(3). As a drafting convention, it treats these sales as security
interests. The term "accounts" is defined more broadly in Rev.
UCC § 9-102(a)(2) to include not only payment obligations aris-
ing from the sale or lease of goods or the provision of services,
but other payment obligations such as license fees payable for the
use of software, credit card receivables, and health care insurance
receivables. This expanded definition effectively shrinks the re-
sidual category of general intangibles, the outright sale of which
remains outside the scope of Article 9; this will facilitate securiti-
zation transactions involving a wider variety of receivables. An-
other important contribution of the revision is the clarification
that an outright seller of accounts retains no interest in the prop-
erty sold, thereby rejecting Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer,2 which
erroneously held that the outright seller of accounts retained suf-
ficient ownership that the transfer did not remove the property
from its bankruptcy estate. Rev. UCC § 9-318(a).
Revised Article 9 also covers the outright sale of "promis-
2. See Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer, 995 F2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied 510 US 993 (1993).
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sory notes," a term that excludes checks or certificates of deposit.
Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(65). The purpose behind this expansion of
scope is to facilitate securitization of this type of payment in-
strument.
The outright sale of chattel paper has always been within
the scope of Article 9. The revision broadens the definition of
chattel paper (Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(11)) to include obligations se-
cured by software to the extent sold in integrated transactions
with specific goods. Outright sales of such hybrid chattel paper
will be within the scope of Article 9, as will sales of electronic
chattel paper. See Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(31) and Official Comment
5(b) to that section.
Current Article 9 excludes from its scope the outright sale
of general intangibles. While the revision continues this general
exclusion, it brings within the scope of Article 9 most sales of
payment intangibles, defined in Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(61) as gen-
eral intangibles under which the account debtor's principal obli-
gation is a monetary obligation. This primarily means payment
rights that arise out of loan agreements that do not constitute in-
struments. This important change is intended to facilitate securi-
tizations. Outright sales of payment intangibles are automatically
perfected. Rev. UCC § 9-309(a)(3). Automatic perfection permits
financial institutions that sell loan participations to avoid having
a UCC financing statement filed against them.
B. Insurance Claims
The early drafts of the revision would have brought all in-
surance claims, including the assignment of cash surrender value
of life insurance, within the scope of Article 9. The final draft con-
tinues the general exclusion of insurance claims (except as pro-
ceeds). Rev. UCC § 9-109(d)(8). The exclusion probably covers
related transactions such as insurance premium financing. How-
ever, on the theory that originators of insurance receivables aris-
ing from the provision of health care services frequently borrow
against them or sell them in financing transactions, the new cate-
gory of health care insurance receivables (Rev. UCC § 9-
102(a)(46)) is brought within the scope of Revised Article 9. These
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receivables are a subset of accounts. This means that in health
care financing transactions, Article 9 will cover both noninsur-
ance receivables (such as Medicare/Medicaid entitlements) and
private insurance receivables, facilitating their handling as a col-
lateral package.
C. Commercial Tort Claims
Current law excludes all tort claims from the scope of Ar-
ticle 9. Rev. UCC § 9-109(d)(12) brings the assignment of commer-
cial tort claims within the scope of Article 9 for the first time. This
opens up an important new source of collateral for borrowers
and lenders alike. The term is defined in Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(13)
to mean all claims arising from commission of a business tort.
However, no security interest may be taken in after-acquired
commercial tort claims. Rev. UCC § 9-204(b)(2). Article 9 will
continue to exclude security interests in tort claims for bodily in-
jury and other nonbusiness tort claims of natural persons; any
assignments of such claims will be subject to common law rules.
All tort claims, when reduced to a structured settlement form,
come back into Article 9 as payment intangibles. Rev. UCC § 9-
109, Official Comment 15.
D. Agricultural Liens
Current Article 9 covers only consensual security interests
and not statutory liens. Early drafts of the revision would have
brought all statutory liens covering personal property within the
scope of Article 9. The drafters backed away from this radical po-
sition, but the revision still makes a major change by bringing
within its scope nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens, in-
cluding landlord's liens. Rev. UCC §§ 9-102(a)(5), 9-109(a)(2). In
general, perfection of agricultural statutory liens is accomplished
by UCC filing (Rev. UCC § 9-310(a)), and priority rules applica-
ble to security interests apply to statutory agricultural liens (Rev.
UCC § 9-322(a)), unless the statute expressly gives priority to the
agricultural lien (Rev. UCC § 9-322(g)). Law outside of Article 9
will govern the creation and attachment of agricultural liens. An
2000]
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agricultural lien is not a security interest, so Article 9 applies only
to the extent it expressly refers to agricultural liens. These new
rules will have a major impact on agricultural states.
In addition, Appendix II to Revised Article 9 contains
model definitions and priority rules relating to production-
money security interests held by secured parties that give new
value used in the production of crops. These provisions give the
production-money lender superpriority akin to a PMSI. They
would greatly strengthen the priority position of crop production
lenders under current UCC § 9-312(2). Because no consensus
emerged on these priority rules during the drafting process, Ap-
pendix II is optional to each state.
E. Deposit Accounts
Except in a few states (California, Illinois, Louisiana, Ha-
waii, and Idaho), current Article 9 covers security interests in de-
posit accounts only as proceeds of other collateral, such as
accounts receivable. The revision covers deposit accounts
(broadly defined in Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(29) to include unre-
stricted transaction accounts) as original collateral, except in con-
sumer transactions. Rev. UCC § 9-109(d)(13). In many cases, this
will eliminate the necessity of tracing proceeds into a deposit ac-
count. A secured creditor may perfect in a deposit account only
by control. Rev. UCC § 9-104.
Revised Article 9 contains several additional new rules
governing deposit accounts, including: which state's law governs
perfection and priority (Rev. UCC § 9-304); priority of conflicting
security interests and setoff rights against a deposit account (Rev.
UCC §§ 9-327, 9-340); rights of transferees of funds from an en-
cumbered deposit account (Rev. UCC § 9-332); the obligations of
the depository bank (Rev. UCC § 9-341); enforcement of security
interests in a deposit account (Rev. UCC § 9-607(c)); and the duty
of a secured party to terminate control of a deposit account (Rev.
UCC § 9-208(b)).
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F. Consignments
Coverage of consignment transactions by Article 9 has
generated a fair amount of litigation over the years. In the name
of clarity, the revision brings all consignment transactions (i.e.,
bailments for the purpose of resale by the bailee, whether called a
sale or return or a true consignment) within its scope. Rev. UCC
§ 9-109(a)(4). The term "consignment" is defined in Rev. UCC
§ 9-102(a)(20) to mean a transaction, regardless of its form, in
which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of
sale. The merchant must deal in goods of that kind under a name
other than that of the person making delivery, must not be an
auctioneer, and the aggregate value of the goods for each deliv-
ery must be $1,000 or more. The revision wisely excludes con-
sumer transactions from Article 9 on the theory that almost no
consumer consignor would be aware of the need to file a financ-
ing statement.
Current UCC § 2-326 is amended to eliminate its coverage
of consignment arrangements, since all such transactions are now
within the scope of Article 9. However, the term "consignment"
is defined in Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(20) to exclude transactions
where the merchant/consignee is generally known by its credi-
tors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others,
thereby eliminating the need for the consignor to file a financing
statement in these situations. This exclusion has the effect of res-
urrecting former UCC § 2-326, which has generated an unfortu-
nate amount of fact-specific litigation regarding whether a
particular consignee is "generally known by its creditors" to be
engaged in the business of selling the goods of others.
Rev. UCC § 9-102, Comment 14, makes this important
point:
The definition of 'consignment' requires that the
goods be delivered "to a merchant for purposes of
sale." If the goods are delivered for another pur-
pose as well, such as milling or processing, the
transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a
purpose of the delivery is "sale." On the other
2000] 135
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hand, if a merchant-processor-bailee will not be
selling the goods itself but will be delivering to
buyers to which the owner-bailor agreed to sell the
goods, the transaction would not be a consign-
ment.
Most important, Revised Article 9 treats all consignments
as purchase-money security interests in inventory, requiring the
consignor to jump through a tough series of hoops in order to
gain priority over financers of the consignee's inventory or the
consignee's trustee in bankruptcy. Rev. UCC § 9-103(d). This re-
quirement is comparable to former UCC § 9-114.
II. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Perfection of security interests under Revised Article 9 is
accomplished in four ways, depending upon the type of collat-
eral: (1) automatically; (2) by possession; (3) by control; and (4) by
filing. The revision makes some changes in all methods, but its
most important contribution is extensive use of the concept of
control.
A. Choice of Law
The threshold issue regarding perfection of security inter-
ests is choice of law. In most cases, this means figuring out in
which state to file a financing statement. The rules under current
Article 9 are found in UCC § 9-103. The more elaborate rules un-
der the revision are found at Rev. UCC §§ 9-301-9-307. The revi-
sion does not address choice of law for purposes other than
perfection and priority. Issues such as attachment and enforce-
ment of security interests are expected to be handled by a choice-
of-law provision in the security agreement, as allowed under
UCC § 1-105. Moreover, for most purposes the law under Article
9 is fairly uniform, minimizing the significance of differences
from one jurisdiction to another.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-301(1), the baseline rule is that the
law governing perfection of security interests, in both tangible
136 [Vol. 4
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and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or auto-
matically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location, as
determined by Rev. UCC § 9-307. This means that, with respect to
tangible collateral such as equipment and inventory, a financing
statement will no longer be filed at the situs of the collateral. This
is a major change in the law. The debtor's location is determined
as follows under Rev. UCC § 9-307:
* A debtor who is an individual is located at the
individual's principal residence.
" A debtor that is an organization and has only
one place of business is located at its place of
business.
" A debtor that is an organization and has more
than one place of business is located at its chief
executive office. Although the term "chief ex-
ecutive office" is not defined, Comment 2 to
Rev. UCC § 9-307 states that it means "the
place from which the debtor manages the main
part of its business operations or other affairs.
This is the place where persons dealing with
the debtor would normally look for credit in-
formation, and is the appropriate place for fil-
ing."
The debtor location standard has great benefits for debtors
and secured creditors alike, as discussed in Comment 4 to Rev.
UCC § 9-307. It greatly simplifies the choice-of-law rules for dif-
ferent types of collateral. The law of a single jurisdiction governs
perfection with respect to both tangible and intangible collateral,
facilitating package treatment in loan documentation. Under cur-
rent law, different filing rules apply depending on whether the
collateral is tangible or intangible. There is no more need for the
special rule under current law (UCC § 9-103(1)(c)) concerning
PMSIs in tangible collateral that is intended to move from one
jurisdiction to another. The new rules will reduce the frequency
2000]
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of cases in which the governing law changes when collateral is
moved across state lines, since moving tangible collateral occurs
much more frequently than changing the debtor's location. The
new rules also eliminate the need to distinguish between mobile
goods and ordinary goods, an issue that has generated a fair
amount of litigation under current law.
These baseline debtor location rules only apply if the rele-
vant jurisdiction has a filing office. If it does not, the debtor is
deemed located in the District of Columbia. For example, a non-
U.S. debtor located in a foreign country that has no filing system
for security interests in personal property would require a filing
in Washington, D.C. See Rev. UCC § 9-307, Comment 3, with ex-
amples.
Of great importance, Rev. UCC § 9-307(c) provides that a
registered organization organized under the laws of State X is
deemed located in that state. The term "registered organization,"
defined in Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(70), includes corporations, lim-
ited partnerships, and limited-liability companies. This means
that, for a corporate debtor, the place to file a financing statement
covering both tangible and intangible collateral would be the
state of the debtor's incorporation. This "birth certificate" stan-
dard is a major change from current law. Even though it may
seem that Delaware will be inundated with UCC filings under
the revision, the fact is that most companies that engage in Arti-
cle 9 secured lending are incorporated elsewhere. Comment 4 to
Rev. UCC § 9-307 discusses the benefits of the new registered or-
ganization rule:
Determining the registered organization-debtor's
location by reference to the jurisdiction of organiza-
tion could provide some important side benefits for
the filing systems. A jurisdiction could structure its
filing system so that it would be impossible to make
a mistake in a registered organization-debtor's
name on a financing statement. For example, a filer
would be informed if a filed record designated an
incorrect corporate name for the debtor. Linking fil-
ing to the jurisdiction of organization also could re-
138 [Vol. 4
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duce pressure on the system imposed by transac-
tions in which registered organizations cease to ex-
ist-as a consequence of merger or consolidation,
for example. The jurisdiction of organization might
prohibit such transactions unless steps were taken
to ensure that existing filings were refiled against a
successor or terminated by the secured party.
The baseline debtor location rule is subject to various ex-
ceptions:
* It does not apply to possessory security interests,
where the governing law is that of the state
where the collateral is physically located. Rev.
UCC § 9-307(2).
" While negotiable documents, goods, instru-
ments, money, or tangible chattel paper is lo-
cated in a jurisdiction, the law of that
jurisdiction governs: (1) perfection of a security
interest in goods by filing a fixture filing; (2)
perfection of a security interest in timber to be
cut; and (3) the effect of perfection and priority
of a nonpossessory security interest in the col-
lateral. Rev. UCC § 9-307(3).
* For as-extracted collateral such as oil and gas,
the law of the jurisdiction in which the well-
head or minehead is located governs perfection
and priority. Rev. UCC § 9-307(4).
" The baseline rule does not apply to goods cov-
ered by an agricultural lien, where the govern-
ing law is that of the jurisdiction where the
farm products are located. Rev. UCC § 9-302.
" The baseline rule does not apply to vehicles
covered by a certificate of title, where the gov-
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erning law is the jurisdiction that issued the
certificate. Rev. UCC § 9-303. Rev. UCC § 9-
303(a) makes it clear that the rule applies to cer-
tificates of title issued by a state having no
other contacts with the vehicles or the debtor;
this result is consistent with titling practices in
the trucking industry. However, if the vehicles
are held for sale or lease as inventory, or under
lease, the normal filing rules apply. Rev. UCC
§ 9-311(d). This rule has been a trap for unwary
inventory lenders under current law, and will
continue to be so under the revision. Comment
6 to Rev. UCC § 9-307 discusses problems faced
in coordinating Article 9 with the variety of cer-
tificate of title statutes, and in determining pri-
orities where multiple certificates have been
issued.
It does not apply to security interests in deposit
accounts, where the governing law is that of
the jurisdiction where the depository bank is
located. Rev. UCC § 9-304.
It does not apply to security interests in in-
vestment property, where the governing law
depends on the nature of the interest. For certi-
ficated securities, the governing law is that of
the jurisdiction in which the certificate is lo-
cated. For uncertificated securities, the govern-
ing law is that of the issuer's jurisdiction. For
security entitlements, securities accounts,
commodity contracts, and commodity ac-
counts, the governing law is that of the inter-
mediary's jurisdiction. Rev. UCC § 9-305.
It does not apply to security interests in letters
of credit, where the governing law is that of the
issuer's or nominated party's jurisdiction. Rev.
[Vol. 4
REVISED ARTICLE 9
UCC § 9-306.
B. Automatic Perfection
The revision carries forward many of the rules of current
law allowing automatic perfection. Such security interests are
perfected when they attach. Some new rules expand the situa-
tions where a security interest is automatically perfected. Situa-
tions providing for automatic attachment under the revision are
as follows:
As under current law, a purchase-money security interest
in consumer goods is automatically perfected. However, titled
motor vehicles require the secured party's lien on the title. Rev.
UCC § 9-309(1). Moreover, filing is required to perfect a non-
PMSI in consumer goods, and failure to file for a PMSI in con-
sumer goods exposes the secured party to priming by a con-
sumer BFP under Rev. UCC § 9-320(b). Finally, a fixture filing is
required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures under
Rev. UCC § 9-334.
Perfection of a security interest in collateral automatically
perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation for the col-
lateral such as a letter of credit or guaranty. Rev. UCC § 9-308(d).
This is a new rule. Here is the example given in Comment 5:
Example: Buyer is obligated to pay Debtor for goods sold.
Buyer's president guarantees the obligation. Debtor creates a se-
curity interest in the right to payment (account) in favor of
Lender. Under Section 9-203(f), the security interest attaches to
Debtor's rights under the guarantee (supporting obligation). Un-
der subsection (d), perfection of the security interest in the ac-
count constitutes perfection of the security interest in Debtor's
rights under the guarantee.
In a closely related new rule, perfection of a security inter-
est in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security
interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal
or real property securing the right. Rev. UCC § 9-308(e), Com-
ment 6, gives this example:
Example: Owner gives to Mortgagee a mortgage on Black-
acre to secure a loan. Owner's obligation to pay is evidenced by a
2000]
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promissory note. In need of working capital, Mortgagee borrows
from Financer and creates a security interest in the note in favor
of Financer. Section 9-203(g) adopts the traditional view that the
mortgage follows the note; i.e., the transferee of the note acquires
the mortgage, as well. This subsection adopts a similar principle:
perfection of a security interest in the right to payment consti-
tutes perfection of a security interesting the mortgage securing it.
Perfection of a security interest in a securities account also
perfects a security interest in the securities entitlements carried in
the account. Rev. UCC § 9-308(f). This is a new rule.
In another new rule, perfection of a security interest in a
commodities account also perfects a security interest in the com-
modity contracts carried in the account. Rev. UCC § 9-308(g).
As under current law, perfection is automatic for an as-
signment of accounts or payment intangibles that does not by it-
self or in conjunction with other assignments to the same
assignee transfer a significant part of the assignor's outstanding
accounts or payment intangibles. Rev. UCC § 9-309(2).
Perfection is automatic for the outright sale of a payment
intangible or promissory note. Rev. UCC §§ 9-309(3), (4). This
would include bank loan participations. These are new rules.
In another new rule, perfection is automatic for a security
interest created by the assignment of a health care insurance re-
ceivable to the provider of the health care goods or services. Rev.
UCC § 9-309(5). When an individual assigns a right to payment
under an insurance policy to the provider, the provider has no
need to file a financing statement against the individual. How-
ever, the normal filing rules apply to other assigmnents of health
care insurance receivables, that is, assignments from the provider
to a financer.
Perfection is automatic for security interests created for
policy reasons in other parts of the UCC, including aggrieved
buyers of defective goods (UCC § 2-711(3)), liens in favor of col-
lecting banks (UCC § 4-210)), and the security interest of an is-
suer or nominated party in a letter of credit (UCC § 5-118). Rev.
UCC §§ 9-309(6), (7), (8).
In other new rules, perfection is automatic for a security
interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset and a security
[Vol. 4142
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interest in investment property created by a securities or com-
modities intermediary. Rev. UCC §§ 9-309(9), (10), (11). For an
elaboration of these new rules, see Comment 6.
In line with current law, perfection is automatic for a se-
curity interest created by an assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors. Rev. UCC § 9-309(12).
As under current law, perfection is automatic for a secu-
rity interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a
decedent's estate. Rev. UCC § 9-309(13). However, the revision
changes current law in requiring filing, for the first time, for a
collateral assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust. This new
filing requirement reflects the fact that beneficial interests in
trusts are now used as collateral with increasing frequency in
commercial transactions. See Comment 7.
C. Perfection by Possession
As under current law, possession is a permissible method
of perfection for negotiable documents of title, goods, instru-
ments, or tangible chattel paper and certificated securities. Rev.
UCC § 9-313(a). It is the exclusive method of perfecting a security
interest in money. In a departure, the revision provides for pos-
session as a way of perfecting a security interest in a titled motor
vehicle, but only in limited circumstances. Rev. UCC §§ 9-313(b),
9-316(d). See also Rev. UCC § 9-316, Comment 5, with examples.
Consistent with current law, the term "possession" is not defined
in the statute. However, Comment 3 to Rev. UCC § 9-313 tells us
that principles of agency apply. If the collateral is clearly in pos-
session of the secured party's agent, and if the agent is not also
an agent of the debtor, the secured party has possession without
the need to rely on the acknowledgment of a third-party bailee.
The debtor cannot qualify as the secured party's agent, nor can a
person under the debtor's control. "In a typical escrow arrange-
ment, where the escrowee holds possession of collateral as agent
for both the secured party and the debtor, the debtor's relation-
ship to the escrowee is not such as to constitute retention of pos-
session by the debtor."
In one of its most important reforms, the revision changes
2000]
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current law by allowing a security interest in an instrument to be
perfected by either possession or filing. Rev. UCC §§ 9-312(a), 9-
313(a). As Comment 2 to Rev. UCC § 9-312 states: "The rule is
likely to be particularly useful in transactions involving a large
number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues to
collect from the makers." However, a security interest perfected
by possession will have greater protection against the claims of a
holder in due course or competing secured creditor who has per-
fected by filing. Rev. UCC § 9-330(d). In addition, filing does not
constitute notice that would preclude a later purchaser from be-
coming a holder in due course who takes free of all claims and
defenses. Rev. UCC § 9-331. In most cases, possession will be the
method of choice for instruments, though filing will protect the
secured creditor from the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.
In some cases, possession will also bring control. For ex-
ample, a secured party with both possession and a proper in-
dorsement of certificated securities will also have control, which
will provide greater priority against competing secured creditors
than perfection by possession alone.
The law of the state of the physical location of the collat-
eral governs perfection of a security interest in collateral per-
fected by possession. Rev. UCC § 9-301(2).
One major change made by the revision is elimination of
the "bailee with notice" mechanism. Under current law, a se-
cured party may simply notify a third party of its interest in a
promissory note or certificated security held by the third party as
pledgee, and its security interest is perfected from the moment
the third party receives notice. UCC § 9-305. The revision (Rev.
UCC § 9-313(c)(1)) provides that a security interest in collateral in
possession of a third party is perfected only when the third party
acknowledges in an authenticated record that it holds for the se-
cured party's benefit. The third party is not required to make
such an acknowledgment. That is the bad news for the secured
party. The good news is that a security interest in an instrument
or certificated security can be perfected by filing, though filing
will not protect against subsequent delivery of the collateral to a
third party. Under the revision, a lessee of collateral in the ordi-
nary course of the debtor's business will not qualify as a third
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party in possession of the collateral by giving an acknowledg-
ment. This rule rejects cases like In re Atlantic Systems, Inc.,3 hold-
ing that notification to debtor-lessor's lessee was sufficient to
perfect a security interest in the leased goods.
In an accommodation to real estate mortgage warehouse
lending, a secured party need not obtain an acknowledgment
from a bailee where the secured party delivers the collateral to a
bailee if the secured party instructed the bailee before or at the
time of delivery to hold possession of the collateral for the se-
cured party's benefit or to redeliver it. Rev. UCC § 9-313(h). The
policy behind this rule is stated in Comment 9:
[Warehouse lenders] typically send mortgage notes
to prospective purchasers under cover of letters ad-
vising the prospective purchasers that the lenders
hold security interests in the notes. These lenders
relied on notification to maintain perfection under
former 9-305. Requiring them to obtain authenti-
cated acknowledgments from each prospective pur-
chaser...could be unduly burdensome and
disruptive of established practices.
As under current Article 9, Rev. UCC § 9-207 sets forth the
rights and duties of a secured party in possession of collateral.
The baseline rule is that the secured party use "reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party's
possession. In the case of chattel paper or an instrument, reason-
able care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights
against prior parties unless otherwise agreed." As Comment 2
points out, in many cases a secured party in possession of collat-
eral may satisfy this duty by notifying the debtor of action that
should be taken and allowing the debtor to take the action itself.
The duty to exercise reasonable care cannot be disclaimed by
agreement, though the parties remain free to determine by
3. In re Atlantic Systems, Inc., 135 BR 463 (Bankr. SDNY 1992), 16 UCC Rep.
2d 1204.
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agreement standards that are not "manifestly unreasonable"
what constitutes reasonable care. This is an area where limited
freedom of contract can be quite useful.
Reasonable expenses incurred in the custody, preserva-
tion, or operation of the collateral are chargeable to the debtor-
including insurance and taxes. The risk of accidental loss is on
the debtor to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance
coverage. The secured party must keep the collateral identifiable,
but fungible collateral may be commingled. Finally, the secured
party may operate the collateral in limited situations. The se-
cured party may hold as additional collateral any proceeds re-
ceived from the collateral (except money, which must be applied
to the debt or remitted to the debtor).
Of significance, Rev. UCC § 9-207(c)(3) provides that the
secured party "may create a security interest in the collateral."
This is the repledge, a transaction that is discussed in detail in
Comments 5 and 6. These comments make it clear that a repledge
of collateral may not impair the debtor's right of redemption.
One example given in comment 5 is a negotiable note payable to
the debtor that Secured Party #1 repledges to Secured Party #2.
The debtor retains the right to redeem the note upon payment to
Secured Party #1 of all obligations secured by the note. However,
the debtor's unimpaired right to redeem as against Secured Party
#1 may not be enforceable as against Secured Party #2. Finally,
Rev. UCC § 9-207(d) provides that the general duty of care ap-
plies only to true security interests and not to nonrecourse sales
of receivables where the seller retains no interest in the collateral
and so is not disadvantaged by the secured party's noncompli-
ance with the requirements of the section.
D. Perfection by Control
With respect to various types of collateral, perfection is
accomplished by control over the collateral. The concept of con-
trol, which was introduced into Article 9 with the revision of Ar-
ticle 8 governing investment property, has now been expanded to
cover deposit accounts (Rev. UCC § 9-104), electronic chattel pa-
per (Rev. UCC § 9-105), investment property (Rev. UCC § 9-106),
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and letter-of-credit rights (Rev. UCC § 9-107).
The only way to perfect a security interest in deposit ac-
counts taken as original collateral is by control. Control occurs
automatically when the relevant depository institution is the se-
cured party. For third parties, it occurs when: (1) the depository
institution (with the consent of the debtor) has agreed that it will
follow directions from the secured party without further consent
by the debtor; or (2) the secured party becomes the customer by
putting the account in its own name. The secured party has con-
trol over the deposit account even though the debtor retains the
right to access the account. Rev. UCC § 9-104(b).
Control of electronic chattel paper occurs when there is a
special electronic identification of the secured party on the elec-
tronic copy of the chattel paper. Rev. UCC § 9-105. Unlike deposit
accounts, control and filing are alternative methods of perfecting
a security interest in electronic chattel paper. Rev. UCC §§ 9-
312(a), 9-314(a). Because electronic chattel paper cannot be trans-
ferred, assigned, or possessed in the same manner as tangible
chattel paper, Rev. UCC § 9-105 defines "control" in a special
manner, as the functional equivalent of possession of tangible
chattel paper. Comment 3 states:
One requirement for establishing control is that a particu-
lar copy be an "authoritative copy." Although other copies may
exist, they must be distinguished from the authoritative copy.
This may be achieved, for example, through the methods of au-
thentication that are used or by business practices involving the
marking of any additional copies. When tangible chattel paper is
converted to electronic chattel paper, in order to establish that a
copy of the electronic chattel paper is the authoritative copy it
may be necessary to show that the tangible chattel paper is the
authoritative copy or it may be necessary to show that the tangi-
ble chattel paper no longer exists or has been permanently
marked to indicate that it is not the authoritative copy.
Comment 4 goes on to discuss marketplace development
of alternative control systems. Filing is another way to perfect on
chattel paper, including electronic chattel paper. Rev. UCC § 9-
312(a).
The only way to perfect a security interest in letter-of-credit
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rights is by control. Control over letter-of-credit rights occurs
when the issuer (or a nominated person such as a confirming
bank) consents to an assignment of proceeds. Rev. UCC § 9-107.
By contrast, under current law a security interest in a benefici-
ary's right to proceeds from a letter of credit can be perfected
only by taking possession of the letter. UCC § 9-304(1). The revi-
sion properly shifts away from physical possession of the letter to
control over disposition of the proceeds, a method that is more in
tune with modem commercial practice. A security interest in let-
ter-of-credit rights can also be perfected automatically by perfect-
ing a security interest in a supported obligation. However,
perfecting this way-without control-could make it difficult for
the secured party to enforce its claim to the proceeds of the letter.
The drafters draw a careful distinction between a beneficiary's
assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit as collateral for a
loan and transfer of the letter itself, by which the transferee be-
comes the beneficiary and acquires the right to draw. UCC § 5-
114(e) provides that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or
nominated person are independent of the beneficiary's assign-
ment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the
assignee's right to the proceeds. For this reason, transfer does not
appear in Article 9 as a means of control or perfection.
Control over investment property exists when a securities
intermediary (with the consent of the debtor) has agreed with the
secured party that it will follow directions from the secured party
without further consent from the debtor. Rev. UCC §§ 9-106, 8-
106. Comment 7 to UCC § 8-106 clarifies that a secured party's
conditional right to instruct the financial intermediary does not
preclude control so long as satisfaction of the condition does not
require the debtor's consent. This would allow the debtor to con-
tinue directing investments in a securities account without dan-
ger to continued perfection of the security interest. With respect
to certificated securities, possession plus a proper indorsement
yields control. Rev. UCC § 9-314 ensures that a secured party re-
tains control in repledge transactions that are typical in the secu-
rities markets. Filing is an alternative way to perfect on
investment property, though it is not nearly as safe as control.
Rev. UCC § 9-312(a).
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Rev. UCC § 9-208 imposes on a secured party with control
over a deposit account, investment property, or a letter-of-credit
right the duty to relinquish control when there is no secured obli-
gation and no commitment to give value. For deposit accounts,
the secured party must send to the depository bank an authenti-
cated statement that releases the bank from any further obliga-
tion to comply with instructions from the secured party. For
investment property, the secured party must send to the securi-
ties intermediary or commodity intermediary an authenticated
record that releases the intermediary from any further obligation
to comply with entitlement orders originated by the secured
party. For letter-of-credit rights, the secured party must send to
each person with a duty to pay or deliver proceeds to the secured
party an authenticated release from any further obligation.
E. Perfection by Filing
Filing will remain the most important method of perfec-
tion. One of the major contributions made by the revision is to
reform and modernize the UCC filing system. Following are its
most important contributions in this respect.
1. Location of Filings
In sharp contrast to current law, all filings governed by the
revision are to be made in the jurisdiction where the debtor is lo-
cated. This crucial choice-of-law provision, found at Rev. UCC
§ 9-301(1), replaces the current rule under which the secured
party must file in the state where tangible collateral is physically
located. Under current law, the debtor's location only controls
where the collateral is intangible (such as accounts and general
intangibles) or mobile goods. UCC § 9-103. The new rule should
reduce transaction costs and legal risk by enabling the secured
party to package all types of collateral into a single filing-in the
state where the debtor is located.
But where is the debtor located? Rev. UCC § 9-307, follow-
ing current law, provides that the debtor's location is its place of
business (or chief executive office, if the debtor has more than
2000]
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one place of business). However, there are two important excep-
tions to the general rule:
A registered organization that is organized under the laws
of a state is located in that state. Rev. UCC § 9-307(e). For a cor-
poration, limited partnership, or limited liability company, the
place to file is the entity's "birthplace" -that is, its state of incor-
poration. Although it might appear that this new rule will flood
the Delaware UCC filing office, most corporations are registered
elsewhere. The birthplace test should be more certain than the
current chief executive office standard. If the debtor reincorpo-
rates in another state, perfection will lapse after four months.
Rev. UCC § 9-307(g) keeps the location intact in spite of suspen-
sion of the company's status or its dissolution.
A foreign debtor that would otherwise be located in a for-
eign jurisdiction without a public filing system is deemed to be
located in Washington, D.C. Rev. UCC § 9-307(c). (The current
rule under UCC § 9-103 allowing perfection by notification to ac-
count debtors is ineffective because it allows secret liens.) This
new rule would allow a domestic filing for a non-U.S. debtor by
choice-of-law provision. The same is generally true of entities or-
ganized under federal law. Rev. UCC § 9-307(f).
An individual debtor is located at his or her principal
residence.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-501, all filings are to be central, ex-
cept: (1) fixture filings; (2) filings covering as-extracted minerals
(e.g., oil and gas); or (3) timber to be cut. An alternative way to
perfect a security interest in fixtures is to do a central filing,
though failure to make a local fixture filing means that the se-
cured party cannot claim purchase-money priority in the fixtures
under Rev. UCC § 9-334. However, if fixtures belong to a trans-
mitting utility, filing is central, with the secretary of state; the
definition of the term "transmitting utility," found at Rev. UCC
§ 9-102(a)(80), is somewhat broader than under current law. The
theory behind a single, central filing for transmitting utilities is
that the "nature of the debtor will inform persons searching the
record as to where to make a search." Rev. UCC § 9-501, Com-
ment 5.
Minerals and timber are treated somewhat differently, as
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discussed in Comment 3. A filing in the office where a real estate
mortgage would be recorded perfects a security interest in as-
extracted collateral such as oil and gas. Inasmuch as the security
interest does not attach until extraction, the filing continues to be
effective after extraction. Timber to be cut, however, may be
goods before it is cut; once cut, the filing in the real estate office
ceases to be effective. At that point, the timber is subject to the
central filing rules governing inventory. Also, once timber is cut,
the state of filing is the state of the debtor's location, not where
the timber is located.
Current Article 9 gives states three alternatives for filing;
those alternatives are eliminated in the revision. This should re-
duce the net costs of secured transactions by decreasing the
number and uncertainty of required filings. It remains to be seen
whether local filing officers will resist this move toward centrali-
zation with the secretary of state. In any case, the policy rationale
behind more centralized filing is well stated in Comment 2:
The principal advantage of state-wide filing is ease of ac-
cess to credit information which the files exist to provide. Con-
sider for example the national distributor who wishes to have
current information about the credit standing of the thousands of
persons he sells to on credit. The more completely the files are
centralized on a state-wise basis, the easier and cheaper it be-
comes to procure credit information; the more the files are scat-
tered in local filing units, the more burdensome and costly.
2. Contents of the Financing Statement-Generally
Under Rev. UCC § 9-502, a financing statement is sufficient
only if it:
* Provides the name of the debtor
" Provides the name of the secured party
" Indicates the covered collateral
• A realty-related financing statement (for fix-
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tures, as-extracted collateral, and timber to be
grown) must also:
o Indicate that it covers this type of collat-
eral
o Indicate that it is to be filed in the realty
records
o Provide a description of the realty to en-
able cross-indexing
o Provide the name of a record owner if the
debtor does not have an interest of record
* A real estate mortgage is effective as a UCC fi-
nancing statement covering the three types of
realty-related collateral, but only if the mort-
gage:
o Indicates the goods or accounts it covers
o Satisfies the requirements for a financing
statement
o Is duly recorded
Like its predecessor, Revised Article 9 adopts a simplified
notice filing system under which the financing statement con-
tains only skeletal information. If searchers want more detail,
Rev. UCC § 9-210 provides a procedure under which the secured
party, at the debtor's request, may be required to make further
disclosures. For real estate-related collateral, the description of
the realty need not be metes and bounds; the proper test is that a
real estate description "must be sufficient so that the financing
statement will fit into the real-property search system and be
found by a real-property searcher." Rev. UCC § 9-502, Comment
5. For a mortgage that operates as a fixture filing, Rev. UCC § 9-
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515(g) makes the usual five-year duration of the financing state-
ment inapplicable; instead, the UCC filing is effective for the du-
ration of the real-property recording.
One tricky aspect of the revision rules is that, though Rev.
UCC § 9-502 does not indicate that the debtor's address is re-
quired on the financing statement as a condition of perfection,
the filing officer is required to reject a financing statement with-
out the debtor's address. Rev. UCC § § 9-516(b), 9-520(a). Not
surprisingly, the model form includes it. Rev. UCC § 9-521.
In Rev. UCC § 9-505, the revision broadens the concept
under current law of a precautionary filing for leases, licenses,
outright sales, and other nonsecured transactions. Such a filing is
not itself a factor in determining whether the collateral secures an
obligation.
3. Contents of the Financing Statement:
Name of the Debtor
Under the revision, the financing statement must reflect
the exact registered name of the debtor if there is one. Rev. UCC
§ 9-503(a). An incorrect name is seriously misleading if a stan-
dard search does not find it. Rev. UCC § 9-506. The drafters
thought about providing a specific list of acceptable mistakes
(e.g., "Corp." instead of "Corporation") but ended keeping the
"seriously misleading" standard. These new rules seek to over-
turn the maverick line of recent cases holding that a trade name
is acceptable even though the security interest would not be dis-
covered by a searcher using the debtor's precise "legal" name.
Compare In re Mines Tire Co.4 with ITT Commercial Finance Corp.
v. Bank of the West.5 The revision also adds some helpful stan-
dards for naming debtors that are decedents' estates or trusts.
Rev. UCC § 9-503. The revision rejects the nonuniform rule in a
handful of states that requires the tax identification number of
4. In re Mines Tire Co., 194 BR 23, 29 UCC Rep. 2d 617 (Bankr. WDNY 1996)
(result inconsistent with revision).
5. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Bank of the West, 166 F3d 295 (5th Cir.
1999), 37 UCC Rep. 2d 855 (result inconsistent with revision).
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the debtor.
4. Contents of the Financing Statement:
Name of the Secured Party
A financing statement may name a representative of the
secured party without indicating the representative capacity.
Rev. UCC § § 9-502(a)(2), 9-503(d). This rule, which should make
it easier to perfect in multiparty or syndicated credit transactions,
rejects the implicit holding of some decisions that the financing
statement must indicate the representative capacity of the se-
cured creditor whose name appears. See Chemical Bank v. Securihy
Pac. Nat'l Bank.6 Each secured party of record may file amend-
ments with respect to its own interest. Rev. UCC §§ 9-509(c), (d).
Comment 3 to Rev. UCC § 9-503 gives a good example of the rep-
resentative capacity problem:
Example: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of Bank
X, Bank Y, and Bank Z, but not to their representative, the collat-
eral agent (Bank A). The collateral agent is not itself a secured
party. See Section 9-102. Under Sections 9-502(a) and 9-503(d),
however, a financing statement is effective if it names as secured
party Bank A and not the actual secured parties, even if it omits
Bank A's representative capacity.
5. Contents of the Financing Statement: Supergeneric
Collateral Descriptions
Under Rev. UCC § 9-504(2), a supergeneric description of
collateral such as "all assets of the debtor, now owned or hereaf-
ter acquired" is a sufficient description of the collateral in the fi-
nancing statement. This changes current law. However, a
supergeneric description is not allowed in the security agreement.
On a related point, Rev. UCC § 9-502, Comment 2, makes it clear
that the collateral description in the financing statement need not
include a reference to after-acquired property, even if the collat-
6. Chemical Bank v. Security Pac. Natl Bank, 20 F3d 375 (9th Cir. 1994).
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eral is of a type that does not normally turn over-equipment, for
example. This liberal treatment of collateral descriptions reflects
the code's notice filing philosophy and is reinforced by use of the
concept of simply indicating the collateral in the financing state-
ment.
6. Contents of the Financing Statement:
Crop Descriptions
Under current law, the collateral description of growing
crops in both the security agreement and the financing statement
must include a description of the real estate on which the crops
are growing or to be grown. This requirement has generated
much litigation, including problems relating to leased acreage
and harvested crops. See, for example, Farmers Co-op of Ashford,
Inc. v. People's Community Bank of Ashford.7 Since third parties do
not normally search the records on the basis of any real estate de-
scription, the requirement makes no commercial sense. Merci-
fully, the revision eliminates the real estate description
requirement for crop loans. Rev. UCC § 9-108.
7. Contents of the Financing Statement:
The "Minor Error" Rule
Rev. UCC § 9-102(a)(39) defines "financing statement"
broadly to include the initial filing and "any filed record relating
to the initial financing statement." This means that continuation
statements, amendments, and other subsequent filings are con-
sidered to be part and parcel of the original financing statement.
It also means that the "minor error" rule of Rev. UCC § 9-506
clearly covers subsequent filings. Under current law, by contrast,
the minor error rule arguably applies only to the original financ-
ing statement. The cases have gone both ways. Compare Brams
Ltd v. Elf Enters., Inc.8 with In re Kitchin Equip. Co. of Va.9
7. Farmers Co-op of Ashford, Inc. v. People's Community Bank of Ashford,
37 UCC Rep.2d 445 (Ala. App. 1998).
8. Brams Ltd v. Elf Enters., Inc., 573 NW2d 139, 34 UCC Rep. 2d 1158 (Neb.
1998) (continuation statement valid even if it contains a minor error).
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8. Contents of the Financing Statement:
No Debtor Signature
In sharp contrast to current law, the debtor's signature is
not required on a financing statement. Rev. UCC § 9-502. This
will facilitate electronic filing. Instead, the revision prohibits the
filing of an unauthorized financing statement and imposes liability
on those who violate the prohibition. As a practical matter, the
secured party will get the debtor's express authorization for fil-
ing in the security agreement. In fact, the authentication of a se-
curity agreement automatically authorizes the filing of a
conforming financing statement. This is the concept of ipso facto
authorization. See Rev. UCC § 9-509(b), Comment 4, with Exam-
ples. Although debtor authorization is required for financing
statements, it is not required to perfect for agricultural liens; be-
cause such liens arise as a matter of law, the debtor's consent is
not required. Rev. UCC § 9-509(a)(2).
9. Medium Neutrality
The elimination of any requirement that the debtor sign the
financing statement is consistent with the revision's embrace of
medium neutrality, by which the parties may file and otherwise
communicate with a filing office by means of records communi-
cated and stored in media other than paper. The ubiquitous
phrase "authenticate a record" reflects this medium neutrality. It
permits the use of "signatures" that are not hand written on pa-
per and facilitates electronic agreements, such as electronic chat-
tel paper. In a similar vein, the revision does not care who makes
a filing. Instead, it focuses on whose authorization is necessary for
a person to file a record with a filing office. This is consistent with
elimination from the filing system of signatures or other evidence
of authorization, except to the extent that filing offices may
9. In re Kitchin Equip. Co. of Va., 960 F2d 1242, 17 UCC Rep. 2d 322 (4th Cir.
1992) (financing statement termination box checked by mistake instead of partial
release; court treats filing as termination even though mistake was obvious from
face of filing).
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choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with
electronic communications. As long as the appropriate person
authorizes the filing or the debtor is entitled to the termination, it
does not matter who files any given record. Under Rev. UCC § 9-
509, the debtor's authorization is required for the filing of the ini-
tial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral.
The secured party's authorization is required for other amend-
ments. If the secured party has failed to terminate, the debtor is
authorized to do so.
10. Postfiling Changes
As under current law, Rev. UCC § 9-507(a) provides that a
filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collat-
eral that is transferred to a third party, unless the secured party
consents to the transfer free of the lien. There is no duty to refile
under the name of the transferee, creating the risk of secret liens.
The third-party searcher must inquire as to the debtor's source of
title. However, under a new rule found in Rev. UCC § 9-316(a) (3),
the original filing expires after one year if the transferee is located
in another jurisdiction. See Rev. UCC § 9-507, Comment 3, Ex-
ample. If the debtor's name changes in a seriously misleading
way, the secured party has four months to file an amendment to
reflect the name change. Rev. UCC § 9-507(c). If an amendment is
not filed within the four-month grace period, the security interest
becomes unperfected as to all collateral acquired by the debtor
more than four months after the change. As under current law,
failure to meet the four-month deadline would not cause a loss in
perfection with respect to collateral that was owned by the debtor
under its original name.
The revision makes a security agreement effective against
a person who becomes bound by the secured obligation under
principles of successor liability. Rev. UCC § 9-203(d). This could
happen by contract or by operation of law. As an extension of
this rule, an old financing statement is effective to perfect a secu-
rity interest as against a new debtor who becomes bound by a
predecessor's security agreement, assuming that the information
in the financing statement is not seriously misleading. Rev. UCC
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§ 9-508. If the financing statement is seriously misleading, perfec-
tion lapses with respect to collateral acquired by the new debtor
more than four months after the new debtor becomes bound on
the security agreement, unless the secured party files a new ini-
tial financing statement (not an amendment) before the expira-
tion of the grace period. This new rule, which is parallel to that
governing a single debtor whose name changes, is intended to
cover situations where the debtor changes its business struc-
ture-as when a sole proprietorship incorporates.
11. Filing Office Operations
The revision includes several provisions dealing with fil-
ing office operations:
It prohibits the filing office from bouncing a filing except
in very limited situations; this rule is designed to relieve the fil-
ing office of any duty to evaluate the substance of a financing
statement. Rev. UCC § § 9-516(b), 9-520(a).
The filing officer is obliged to link all subsequent docu-
ments to the original financing statement to which they relate.
Rev. UCC § 9-519.
The filing office may expunge a financing statement and
related records from the files no earlier than one year after lapse
(e.g., lapse occurs five years from the last filing date). Rev. UCC
§ § 9-515, 9-519, 9-522. Thus, a financing statement and related
records would be discovered by a search of the files even after
the filing of a termination statement.
Wrongful refusal by a filing officer to accept a financing
statement does not prevent it from being effective, except that a
subsequent secured party who gives value in reasonable reliance
on the absence of the financing statement will have priority. Rev.
UCC § 9-516(b). This change in the law is based on the idea that
the first filer is in the best position to determine whether the fil-
ing office accepted the filing.
If the filing office accepts a financing statement but does
not index it properly, a subsequent searcher who does not find it
will lose to the first secured party. Rev. UCC § 9-517.
The revision provides for the promulgation of filing office
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rules to fill in details left out of the statute. Rev. UCC § 9-526.
12. Bogus Filings and Debtor Terminations
In response to the posse comitatus problem in some parts of
the country, where wild vigilantes file fraudulent financing
statements against public officials and other prominent persons
for political reasons, the revision gives the debtor the opportunity
to file a correction statement. The filing of the correction state-
ment does not affect the related financing statement; it just pro-
vides additional information to persons reviewing the record.
Rev. UCC § 9-518. This approach is parallel to rights given to ag-
grieved debtors under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In a related
rule, a debtor may file an effective termination statement if the
secured party has a duty to file and has failed to do so. Rev. UCC
§ § 9-509(d)(2).
13. Duration of Filing
The revision retains the baseline five-year filing duration,
with continuation statements to be filed within six months of the
end of the five-year period. Rev. UCC § 9-515(d). A continuation
statement filed outside the six-month window is ineffective and
the filing office is obligated to reject it. Rev. UCC § 9-510. How-
ever, Rev. UCC § 9-515(b) provides that an initial financing
statement filed in connection with a public-finance transaction or
a manufactured-home transaction is good for 30 years. These are
new provisions reflecting special situations where the shorter
five-year duration is not appropriate.
Terminations are governed by Rev. UCC § 9-513. As un-
der current law, no duty is imposed on the secured party to ter-
minate unless demanded by the debtor, except in the case of
consumer goods. If the debtor did not authorize the filing of a
financing statement in the first place, the secured party of record
must file a termination statement or suffer penalties just as surely
as it would if filing an unauthorized financing statement. See
Rev. UCC § 9-625(e). Once a termination statement is filed, the
related financing statement ceases to be effective (Rev. UCC § 9-
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513(d)), but it will remain of record until at least one year after it
lapses with respect to all secured parties of record. Rev. UCC § 9-
519(g).
14. Amendments
Rev. UCC § 9-512 addresses changes to financing state-
ments, including addition and deletion of collateral, assignment,
continuation, and termination. These are all called amendments
though they raise different concerns. An amendment must iden-
tify the initial financing statement by its file number. In general,
the filing of an amendment does not extend the period of effec-
tiveness of the financing statement. Secured parties of record
may make changes in the public record without the need to ob-
tain the debtor's signature; however, the filing of an amendment
that adds collateral or adds a debtor must be authorized by the
debtor in order to be effective.
15. Assignments
As under current law, no filing of an assignment is re-
quired as a condition of continuing the perfected status of the se-
curity interest against creditors and transferees of the original
debtor. Rev. UCC § 9-310(c). However, if an assignment is not
filed, the assignor remains the secured party of record, with
power to authorize the filing of effective amendments. Rev. UCC
§§ 9-511(c), 9-509(d). An initial financing statement may reflect an
assignment of all the secured party's power to authorize an
amendment, by providing the name and address of the assignee.
Rev. UCC § 9-514(a). A secured party of record may assign its
interest in a financing statement under the guidelines set forth in
Rev. UCC § 9-514(b).
16. Effectiveness of Filing
Rev. UCC § 9-516(a) follows current law in providing that
the tender of a proper financing statement (or amendment) and
filing fee constitutes filing. The drafters have included a new
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subsection (b) which lists grounds upon which the filing office
may reject a filing, including:
" debtor name
" for an amendment, no identification of the initial
financing statement to which the amendment re-
lates;
* no real estate description sufficient for cross-
indexing;
" no name or mailing address of the secured
party;
" no mailing address for the debtor;
" no indication of whether the debtor is an indi-
vidual or organization;
* if the debtor is an organization, no indication of
the type of organization or the jurisdiction of
organization;
" no name and mailing address of an assignee in a
situation where an assignment was reflected in
the initial financing statement; and
" no filing within the six-month window required
for continuation statements. Subsection (d) pro-
vides that if the filing officer rejects a filing for a
reason other than those set forth in subsection
(b), the filing is still effective except as against a
BFP of the collateral who relied on the absence
of the record.
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17. Model Forms
Rev. UCC § 9-521 provides for uniform, national written
forms of financing statement and related records that must be
accepted by a filing office. (See Figure 5.1, UCC Financing State-
ment; Figure 5.2, UCC Financing Statement Addendum; Figure
5.3, UCC Financing Statement Amendment; Figure 5.4, UCC Fi-
nancing Statement Amendment Addendum.) It is hoped that
these statutory forms will encourage uniformity and efficiency in
the filing system.
F. Continuation of Perfection
As under current law with some changes, a perfected secu-
rity interest in collateral generally continues notwithstanding
sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition unless the se-
cured party authorized the disposition free of the security inter-
est. Rev. UCC § 9-315(a)(1). If the secured party authorizes
disposition but does not indicate that the transfer is free of the
security interest, the presumption is that it is only an authoriza-
tion of disposition subject to the security interest. This clarifies
current law. On the other hand, Comment 2 indicates that the re-
vision leaves to the courts the frequently litigated situation in
which the effectiveness of the secured party's consent to a dispo-
sition is conditioned upon receipt of the proceeds.
Comment 2 also lists the situations in which a transferee
takes free of a perfected security interest even though the disposi-
tion was not authorized:
Under Rev. UCC § 9-320, a buyer of inventory or minerals
in ordinary course of business takes free.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-321(b), a licensee in ordinary course
of a general intangible (such as intellectual property) takes free of
a perfected security interest granted by the licensor.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-321(c), a lessee of goods in ordinary
course of business takes its leasehold interest free of a security
interest in the goods granted by the lessor.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-330, good-faith purchasers of chattel
paper and holders of instruments take free of security interests
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perfected by filing.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-331, special priority is given to hold-
ers in due course of negotiable instruments, holders to which a
negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, and pro-
tected purchasers of a security.
Under Rev. UCC § 9-332, most transferees of funds from a
deposit account and transferees of money take free of a perfected
security interest in the deposit account or money.
Under UCC § 2-403, if the secured party entrusts goods to
a merchant who deals in goods of that kind and the merchant
sells the collateral to a buyer in ordinary course of business, the
buyer takes free of the perfected security interest.
As under current law, a disposition of the collateral by the
debtor enables the creditor's perfected security interest to carry
over to identifiable proceeds. Rev. UCC § 9-315(a)(2). Even
though they are commingled, proceeds can maintain their identi-
fiability through common law tracing principles such as the low-
est intermediate balance rule. Rev. UCC § 9-315(b) and Comment
3. In line with current law, a perfected security interest in pro-
ceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st day after disposition of
the collateral unless: (1) a filed financing statement covers the
original collateral, the proceeds are collateral for which filing is
appropriate in that same office, and the proceeds are not ac-
quired with cash proceeds; (2) the proceeds are identifiable cash
proceeds; or (3) the security interest in proceeds is perfected
within 20 days. Rev. UCC § 9-315(d). The rules governing con-
tinuation of a perfected security interest in proceeds are dis-
cussed in detail in Comment 5, which contains some good
examples.
Continued perfection when the governing law changes is
handled in Rev. UCC § 9-316. The most important rule is that the
secured party has four months in which to refile if the debtor
changes its location from one jurisdiction to another. The situa-
tions where this will arise should be many fewer than under cur-
rent law, where a change in governing law occurs not only when
the debtor changes location (for intangible collateral) but when
tangible collateral is moved to another jurisdiction. A new one-
year grace period for refiling is provided when collateral is trans-
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ferred to a person who becomes bound as a debtor and is located
in another jurisdiction. See also Rev. UCC § 9-507, Comment 3.
This longer grace period is justified on the ground that, even with
the exercise of due diligence, the secured party may be unable to
discover that the collateral has been transferred to a person lo-
cated in another jurisdiction. Rev. UCC § 9-316 also contains
rules covering: (1) continuous perfection of a possessory security
interest in collateral that is brought into another jurisdiction; (2)
vehicles covered by certificates of title; and (3) changes in juris-
diction of banks (for security interests in deposit accounts), issu-
ers of letters of credit (for security interests in letter-of-credit
rights), and securities or commodity intermediaries (for security
interests in investment property).
III. DEFAULT AND ENFORCEMENT
No subject under current Article 9 has generated more
litigation than default and enforcement of security interests. Part
6 of Revised Article 9 makes a number of important changes in
the law governing debtor default and creditor enforcement of se-
curity interests, in both consumer and nonconsumer transactions.
In terms of the parties against which enforcement is sought, the
revision distinguishes among: (1) debtors; (2) obligors; and (3)
secondary obligors. The term "debtor" is defined in Rev. UCC
§ 9-102(a)(28) as the person who owns the collateral (usually the
borrower or credit buyer, but possibly a hypothecator). This is
the grantor of the security interest. The term "obligor" is defined
in Rev. UCC § 9-102(59) as the person who owes the payment ob-
ligation. The term "secondary obligor" is defined in Rev. UCC
§ 9-102(a)(71) as an obligor who stands as guarantor or other
surety with a right of recourse. In most cases, the primary obligor
and the debtor are the same person. If the collateral is hypothe-
cated by a third person who is not personally obligated on the
debt, the borrower is a primary obligor but not a debtor.
A number of the rules found in Part 6 are intended to pro-
tect a party who would be prejudiced by a faulty foreclosure sale.
The borrower who is also the grantor of the security interest is in
that category because such a borrower has a stake in the proper
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enforcement of the security interest. In the same category is a
secondary obligor, who has a stake based on liability for any de-
ficiency following foreclosure. On the other hand, if a primary
obligor gets a hypothecation of collateral from a third party, the
hypothecator would be prejudiced by a faulty foreclosure while
the borrower- against whom the hypothecator would presuma-
bly have a right of recourse and who would owe the full amount
of the debt regardless of how the foreclosure is handled-would
have no stake. Obligors who are neither debtors nor secondary
obligors have no stake in the foreclosure sale. In general, the
rights and duties provided by Part 6 affect nondebtor obligors
only if they are secondary obligors. See Rev. UCC § 9-102, Com-
ment 2.
A. Secured Party's Rights After Default
Rev. UCC § 9-601 sets forth as a general matter the rights
of the secured party following the debtor's default. As with cur-
rent law, the revision does not define "default," leaving that criti-
cal term to definition by the parties in their security agreement.
(For agricultural liens, the time of default is to be determined by
the statute creating the lien. Rev. UCC § 9-606.) On the flip side,
the statute "does not determine whether a secured party's post-
default conduct can constitute a waiver of default in the face of
an agreement stating that such conduct shall not constitute a
waiver." Thus, the courts are free to enforce an antiwaiver clause
in a security agreement, or conclude that the secured party's con-
tinued acquiescence in effect waives the antiwaiver clause. In any
case, the revision recognizes that it is wise for creditors to insert
antiwaiver provisions into security agreements, whether the un-
derlying transaction is commercial or consumer in nature.
Subsection (b) makes it clear that a secured party's rights
and duties with respect to collateral in its possession, as set forth
in Rev. UCC § 9-207, apply not only to possession before default
but to possession after default. Subsection (c) goes one step be-
yond current law by providing not only that a secured party's
rights after default are cumulative, but that they "may be exer-
cised simultaneously." For example, the secured party could pur-
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sue an Article 9 foreclosure against collateral while at the same
time exercising setoff against the debtor's deposit account and
suing a guarantor.
Subsection (e) strengthens current law in favor of the se-
cured party by providing that any judicial lien acquired by the
secured party against the collateral is a continuation of the origi-
nal perfected security interest. The judicial lien relates back to the
earlier of the date of filing or the date of perfection. This rule
gives the foreclosing secured party maximum protection against
competing creditors and insulates it from preference attack by
the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. Following current law, sub-
section (f) provides that an execution sale is an appropriate
method of foreclosure under Article 9. Finally, subsection (g)
states that the duties imposed on foreclosing secured parties do
not apply to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangi-
bles, or promissory notes. Although called secured parties, these
buyers own the property and so may enforce their rights without
regard to the seller or the seller's creditors. That same latitude
applies to a true consignor.
B. Enforcement Against Guarantors
The revision makes it clear that the default and enforce-
ment rules apply to secondary obligors, including guarantors.
Rev. UCC § 9-602. For example, notice of a foreclosure sale must
be given to a guarantor just as surely as it must be given to the
borrower who granted the security interest in the collateral. This
continues the rule of current law. The fighting issue in the cases
under current law is whether a guarantor can waive rights given
by the statute following default by the borrower or credit buyer,
even though the borrower or credit buyer cannot. Earlier drafts
of the revision would have allowed a guarantor in a noncon-
sumer transaction to waive Article 9 defenses, as it could waive
traditional suretyship defenses under the common law. How-
ever, the final draft of the revision reverses on this important
point and generally prohibits predefault waiver by a guarantor
or other secondary obligor. For example, a continuing guaranty
agreement could not waive the secured party's duty to hold a
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commercially reasonable foreclosure sale or to give notice of the
sale to the guarantor. The policy behind this antiwaiver rule is
that a guarantor deserves as much protection against creditor
misbehavior during foreclosure as the borrower who grants the
security interest, since the guarantor is on the hook for any defi-
ciency. The antiwaiver rule follows the weight of case law au-
thority under the current version of Article 9, though it conflicts
with the new Restatement of Suretyship.
Rev. UCC § 9-602 includes a laundry list of postdefault
protections that the debtor cannot waive. However, the section
"does not restrict the ability of parties to agree to settle, compro-
mise, or renounce claims for past conduct that may have consti-
tuted a violation or breach of those rights and duties, even if the
settlement involves an express 'waiver."' Comment 3. In a closely
related provision, Rev. UCC § 9-603 allows the parties to agree
upon standards measuring the fulfillment of the rights of a
debtor and duties of a secured party if those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable. For example, a security agreement
could set forth reasonable guidelines for advertising collateral
prior to a private sale. On the other hand, the term "breach of the
peace" cannot be tinkered with in the security agreement.
C. Collection of Receivables
Current Article 9 is unclear on whether, in directly collect-
ing receivables following the borrower's default, the secured
party may enforce claims against guarantors of the receivables.
The revision (Rev. UCC § 9-607(a)) clearly allows such enforce-
ment rights. In addition, the secured party may step into the
shoes of the debtor and enforce all of the debtor's rights against
account debtors, including the settlement of claims and the en-
forcement of a security interest provided by the account debtor.
Comment 3 gives the example of a breach-of-warranty claim aris-
ing out of a defect in equipment that is collateral, or an action for
an injunction against infringement of a patent that is collateral.
Comment 3 also points out that such claims would be proceeds
of the original collateral under Rev. UCC § 9-315. For authority to
settle and compromise claims against the account debtor, see
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Comment 9. Current UCC § 9-502 is fuzzy on these enforcement
rights, though the same result can be achieved by properly
drafted secured loan documentation.
If the secured party holds a security interest in the
debtor's deposit account, it may apply the account to the debt (if
the secured party is the depository bank) or it may instruct the
bank to pay the balance for its benefit if it has a control agree-
ment. Rev. UCC §§ 9-607(a)(4), (5). These rules illustrate how a
depository bank is a specialized kind of account debtor.
A junior secured party may directly collect collateral un-
der this section even though it knows that a senior creditor is
ahead of it. However, whether the junior has priority in the col-
lected proceeds depends on whether it qualifies as the purchaser
of an instrument (Rev. UCC § 9-330(d)), the holder in due course
of an instrument (UCC § 3-305, Rev. UCC § 9-331(a)), or a trans-
feree of money (Rev. UCC § 9-332(a)). Rev. UCC § 9-607, Com-
ment 5. However, since the senior's lien will not "ride through"
the junior's foreclosure as would be the case for collateral like
equipment, it would seem that the junior who grabs the collec-
tions but cannot claim priority proceeds at the peril of a conver-
sion claim.
In a new departure intended to facilitate the foreclosure of
notes secured by real estate, Rev. UCC § 9-607(b) allows the se-
cured party to proceeds with a nonjudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage securing the note even though the secured party is not
the assignee of record. The subsection enables the creditor to be-
come the assignee of record by recording in the applicable real-
property records the security agreement and an affidavit certify-
ing default by the debtor.
Subsection (d) allows the secured party to deduct from
collections "reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement,
including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred
by the secured party." Comment 10 points out that this includes
only those fees and expenses incurred in proceeding against ac-
count debtors or other third parties. This right to recover ex-
penses arises automatically from the statute. If the secured party
wants to recover from the proceeds of the collateral those fees
and expenses incurred in proceeding against the debtor or obli-
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gor, the security agreement must so provide. Rev. UCC §§ 9-
608(a)(1)(A), 9-625(a)(1). Comment 10 also tells us that the parties
may agree to allocate a portion of the secured party's overhead to
collection and enforcement-an opportunity not often seized in
security agreements.
D. Application of Proceeds
As under current law, the revision provides for application
of foreclosure sale proceeds in the following order: (1) reasonable
expenses incurred in handling the foreclosure; (2) satisfaction of
obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien
that is being enforced; (3) satisfaction of any subordinate obliga-
tions if the foreclosing creditor receives demand before distribu-
tion of the proceeds is completed. The foreclosing creditor must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and the obligor is liable for
any deficiency. Rev. UCC § 9-608. The application of proceeds
does not affect the priority of a creditor senior to the foreclosing
creditor. The senior's security interest rides through the sale un-
scathed. Of course in most cases the senior will be notified by the
junior in advance of the sale, as required by Rev. UCC § 9-611,
and will make sure that the proceeds are first diverted to it. Al-
ternatively, the competing creditors may enter into some kind of
intercreditor agreement regarding application of the foreclosure
sale proceeds.
Perhaps the most important change made by the revision
in this area is found in Rev. UCC § 9-608(a)(3), which addresses
the situation where an enforcing secured party receives noncash
proceeds. Comment 4 gives this example:
Example: An enforcing secured party receives a promis-
sory note from an account debtor who is unable to pay an ac-
count when it is due. The secured party accepts the note in
exchange for extending the date on which the account debtor's
obligation is due. The secured party may wish to credit its debtor
(the assignor) with the principal amount of the note upon receipt
of the note, but probably will prefer to credit the debtor only as
and when the note is paid.
Comment 4 also points out that the parties may provide in
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the security agreement for the method of application of noncash
proceeds. In the absence of such an agreement, "it may well be
commercially reasonable for the secured party to credit its
debtor's obligations only as and when cash proceeds are collected
from the account debtor, especially given the uncertainty that at-
tends the account debtor's eventual payment."
E. Repossession
Under the revision, tangible collateral can still be repos-
sessed by creditor self-help, so long as there is no breach of the
peace. Rev. UCC § 9-609. During the early drafting process there
was a movement to outlaw self-help repossession, at least in con-
sumer transactions, or to define the term "breach of the peace"
with greater specificity. Neither of these initiatives carried the
day. However, Rev. UCC § 9-603, which allows the parties to de-
termine by agreement the standards by which a creditor may en-
force a security interest so long as the standards are not
manifestly unreasonable, does not apply to the duty to refrain
from breach of the peace. This is a watered-down compromise on
the self-help issue. In a pro-debtor reform, Comment 3 approves
of those cases holding under current law that the secured party
cannot delegate away to independent contractors its duty to re-
possess collateral without breach of the peace. A number of cases
have imposed vicarious liability on the secured party even for
punitive damages, and these cases seem to be approved by the
drafters of the revision. See, for example, McCall v. Owens.10
Although the text of Rev. UCC § 9-609 is silent on the
point, Comment 5 discusses the problems that can occur if more
than one secured party is in the picture:
More than one secured party may be entitled to take pos-
session of collateral under this section. Conflicting rights to pos-
session among secured parties are resolved by the priority rules
of this Article. Thus, a senior secured party is entitled to posses-
10. McCall v. Owens, 820 SW2d 748, 17 UCC Rep. 2d 301 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991).
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sion as against a junior claimant. Non-UCC law governs whether
a junior secured party in possession of collateral is liable to the
senior in conversion. Normally, a junior who refuses to relin-
quish possession of collateral upon the demand of a secured
party having a superior possessory right to the collateral would
be liable in conversion.
Rev. UCC § 9-609(c) validates a debtor's agreement to as-
semble collateral and make it available at a place the secured
party designates. However, the revision goes beyond current law
in validating these agreements whether or not they are condi-
tioned on the debtor's default. "For example, a debtor might
agree to make available to a secured party, from time to time, any
instruments or negotiable documents that the debtor receives on
account of collateral." Comment 7.
F. Realty-Related Foreclosures
If a secured creditor is foreclosing on fixtures, case law un-
der current Article 9 indicates that the only remedy after default
is removal of the fixtures from the real property. The fixture fi-
nancer is not allowed to participate in the proceeds of the real
estate foreclosure. See, for example, Maplewood Bank & Trust v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co." In a reform very helpful to fixture financers,
the revision overturns this case law. Rev. UCC § 9-604(b). Under
the revision, a security interest in fixtures may be enforced under
either real-property law or any of the applicable Article 9 provi-
sions. See Comment 3 to Rev. UCC § 9-604.
Rev. UCC § 9-604(a) permits (but does not require) the se-
cured party with a mixed collateral package to proceed as to both
real and personal property in accordance with real-property law.
That same subsection makes it clear that a secured party who ex-
ercises rights under Revised Article 9 with respect to personal
property does not prejudice any rights under real estate law. On
the other hand, Revised Article 9 does not address "one-form-of-
11. Maplewood Bank & Trust v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 625 A2d 537 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 638 A2d 140, 22 UCC Rep. 2d 1209 (NJ 1994).
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action" rules found in some states. Comment 2 puts it this way:
For example, under some anti-deficiency laws,
creditors risk loss of rights against personal prop-
erty collateral if they err in enforcing their rights
against the real property. Under a "one-form-of-
action" rule (or rule against splitting a cause of ac-
tion), a creditor who judicially enforces a real prop-
erty mortgage and does not proceed in the same
action to enforce a security interest in personalty
may (among other consequences) lose the right to
proceed against the personalty. Although statutes of
this kind create impediments to enforcement of se-
curity interests, this Article does not override these
limitations under other law.
The bottom line is that secured creditors foreclosing on a
mixed package of real estate and personal property still need to
be careful about the dangers posed by these special statutes in
some states (such as California).
G. Preparation of Collateral
It has never been clear under current case law whether the
foreclosing creditor can refuse to process or prepare the collateral
prior to sale. UCC § 9-504 allows sale of the collateral "in its then
condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation
or processing." Rev. UCC § 9-610(a) continues that permissive
language. However, Comment 4 to that section notes that some
courts have imposed a duty of preparation or processing on the
creditor. It then states:
Although courts should not be quick to impose a
duty of preparation or processing on the secured
party, subsection (a) does not grant the secured
party the right to dispose of the collateral "in its
then condition" under all circumstances. A secured
party may not dispose of collateral "in its then con-
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dition" when, taking into account the costs and
probable benefits of preparation or processing and
the fact that the secured party would be advancing
the costs at its risk, it would be commercially unrea-
sonable to dispose of the collateral in that condition.
This language indicates that the secured party should en-
gage in a cost-benefit analysis of whether some preparation is
appropriate. One of the factors should be whether these front-
end costs can be recovered from the sale of the collateral or from
the debtor personally.
H. Foreclosure Sale Warranties
In a clarification of current law, Rev. UCC § § 9-610(d) and
(e) provide that a foreclosing secured creditor gives implied war-
ranties of title unless disclaimed. Rev. UCC § 9-610(f) provides
sample disclaimer language, as follows: "There is no warranty
relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the like in this
disposition." The revision is silent with respect to implied war-
ranties of merchantability or fitness, but the courts generally do
not find such warranties if the foreclosing creditor is not a mer-
chant with respect to the collateral or has no special expertise.
See, for example, Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan.1 2 On the
other hand, if the foreclosing creditor is a dealer that does its own
financing or has bought back the secured debtor under a recourse
obligation, the implied warranty of merchantability may well
apply unless disclaimed. See Rev. UCC § 9-610, Comment 11.
L Application of Noncash Proceeds
Current law is unclear on the duties of the secured creditor
when it receives noncash proceeds of a foreclosure sale such as a
promissory note from the foreclosure purchaser. Rev. UCC § 9-
12. Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 329 So2d 92, 18 UCC Rep. 891 (Ala.
1976).
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608(a)(3) provides that the foreclosing creditor need not apply
noncash proceeds to the debtor's obligation; if it chooses to do so,
it must apply them in a commercially reasonable manner. This
rule provides flexibility for the creditor to accept a note as pro-
ceeds and either: (1) establish a commercially reasonable discount
value; or (2) credit the debtor as the secured creditor receives
payments on the note. If the secured creditor makes no applica-
tion of the note to the debt but instead disposes of it to a third
party, the subsequent disposition is subject to the Article 9 fore-
closure rules.
J. Notice of Foreclosure Sale
As under current law, the revision requires notice of the
foreclosure sale to be given to the debtor and any secondary obli-
gor. In a throwback to pre-1972 law, Rev. UCC § 9-611 requires
the secured party to give notification also to other secured parties
who have filed financing statements covering the same collateral,
so long as the collateral is other than consumer goods. Although
this rule imposes a new UCC search requirement on the foreclos-
ing creditor, the theory is that such advance notice will limit
postforeclosure disputes among competing creditors and encour-
age inter-creditor agreements. Rev. UCC § 9-613 provides a statu-
tory form of notice of sale that will serve as a safe harbor for
foreclosing creditors in other than consumer-goods foreclosures.
Since we have seen so much litigation regarding the adequacy of
notice, creditors strongly applaud the safe harbor into which they
may now sail.
Under current law, some courts have imposed a "second
try" duty on creditors who send notification and learn that the
debtor did not receive it. The creditor is required to attempt to
locate the debtor and send another notification. Revised Article 9
punts on this issue, leaving resolution to the courts under the
facts of each case. See Rev. UCC § 9-611, Comment 6. Comment 8
also makes the important point that a secured party may always
elect not to follow through on a foreclosure sale after sending no-
tice. Moreover, a secured party may send a revised notice if its
plans change for disposition. This flexibility can be important.
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In a variation on the notification theme, Comment 8 to
Rev. UCC § 9-610 discusses the impact of the federal securities
laws on Article 9 foreclosures:
Dispositions of investment property may be regu-
lated by the federal securities laws. Although a
"public" disposition of securities under this Article
may implicate the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933, it need not do so. A disposi-
tion that qualifies for a "private placement" exemp-
tion under the Securities Act of 1933 nevertheless
may constitute a "public" disposition within the
meaning of this section. Moreover, the "commer-
cially reasonable" requirements of subsection (b)
need not prevent a secured party from conducting a
foreclosure sale without the issuer's compliance
with federal registration requirements.
Timeliness of notice before disposition of collateral
is governed by Rev. UCC § 9-612. What is a reason-
able time is generally a question of fact. However,
subsection (b) provides a safe harbor, approving no-
tice sent "after default and 10 days or more before
the earliest time of disposition set forth in the notifi-
cation." Like the statutory form of notice, this safe
harbor on timing should be of great benefit to se-
cured creditors foreclosing in nonconsumer set-
tings.
K. Recourse and Repurchase Agreements
Under current law, it is unclear whether transfer of collat-
eral from a secured lender to a guarantor under a recourse ar-
rangement or a manufacturer under a repurchase agreement
constitutes a foreclosure sale requiring the transferor to give no-
tice under Article 9. See UCC § 9-504(5). Rev. UCC § 9-618 clears
muddy waters by providing that a secondary obligor has the
rights and assumes the duties of a secured party if it steps into
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the shoes of the primary obligor on payment of the obligation.
This transfer of collateral to the secondary obligor is not a foreclo-
sure sale, but it relieves the former secured party of further du-
ties. In these recourse, repurchase, or subrogation situations, the
subsequent sale by the transferee is the one that must follow the
foreclosure rules of Article 9.
But other variations yield different results, as contem-
plated by Rev. UCC § 9-618. For example, in order to encourage
floorplan financing of a distributor or dealer, a manufacturer of
durable goods will sometimes agree with the floorplan financer
to repurchase the inventory following the dealer's default. The
purchase price is typically the wholesale price of the goods, plus
costs incurred by the floorplan financer in enforcing its Article 9
security interest. In this scenario, the manufacturer is not a sec-
ondary obligor on the debt, but only has the duty to repurchase
the collateral according to the prescribed formula. Such a repur-
chase agreement would qualify as an Article 9 private foreclosure
sale. If the dealer is properly notified of the transfer and it is oth-
erwise considered commercially reasonable based on the preap-
proved wholesale price buyout, the floorplan lender's deficiency
claim against the dealer should be firmly established.
L. Marshaling
As under current law, after applying the proceeds of sale to
its front-end costs and its own debt, the foreclosing creditor must
pay over any remaining proceeds to a subordinate secured credi-
tor who has made a demand for payment. However, there is no
duty to remit just because the foreclosing creditor was obligated
to notify the junior of the sale. Rev. UCC § 9-615(a). Moreover, a
junior secured party owes no obligation to apply the proceeds of
disposition to the senior, whose lien will ride through the foreclo-
sure. See Rev. UCC § 9-617 and Official Comment 5 to Rev. UCC
§ 9-610. On the other hand, if the junior receives cash proceeds of
a disposition with knowledge that the receipt violates the rights
of the senior, it could constitute a conversion. Rev. UCC § 9-
615 (g).
To what extent will the application of proceeds be gov-
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erned by the equitable doctrine of marshaling? Comment 5 to
Rev. UCC § 9-610 addresses this issue:
When a secured party's collateral is encumbered by an-
other security interest or other lien, one of the claimants may seek
to invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling. As explained by
the Supreme Court, that doctrine "rests upon the principle that a
creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt, may not by his ap-
plication of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who
may resort to only one of the funds." Meyer v. United States, 375
U.S. 233, 236 (1963), quoting Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268
U.S. 449,456-57 (1925). The purpose of the doctrine is "to prevent
the arbitrary action of a senior lienor from destroying the rights
of a junior lienor or a creditor having less security." Id. at 237.
Because it is an equitable doctrine, marshaling "is applied only
when it can be equitably fashioned as to all the parties" having
an interest in the property. Id. This Article leaves courts free to
determine whether marshaling is appropriate in any given case.
See Section 1-103.
M. Calculating the Deficiency: the Rapson Rule
Like current Article 9, the revision allows recovery of a de-
ficiency against the debtor or any secondary obligor, assuming
no misbehavior during the foreclosure. Rev. UCC § 9-615(d).
However, in order to address the problem of procedurally regu-
lar dispositions that bring a very low price, Rev. UCC § 9-615(f)
provides a special method of calculating a deficiency if the collat-
eral is sold to the foreclosing secured party, a related entity, or a
secondary obligor. If the proceeds are significantly below what
would have been fetched had the sale been made to an unrelated
third party, the deficiency is calculated not on the basis of what
was actually received, but on what would have been received if
the sale had been made to an independent third party. The hope
is to preclude large deficiencies based on potentially collusive
foreclosure sales. This new rule is known as the Rapson rule,
named after its distinguished drafter/author, Donald J. Rapson.
The rule only applies in circumstances where the other aspects of
the sale were commercially reasonable. The revision chose this
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approach rather than adopting a flat rule that would treat the
price as a term of the sale that must be commercially reasonable.
On this last point, the revision follows current Article 9 and the
case law under it. However, Official Comment 11 to Rev. UCC
§ 9-610 states that "a low price suggests that a court should scru-
tinize carefully all aspects of a disposition...."
N. Foreclosure Transferees
As under current law, a secured party's disposition of col-
lateral default: (1) transfers to a transferee for value all the
debtor's rights in the collateral; (2) discharges the security inter-
est under which the disposition is made; and (3) discharges any
subordinate security interest. Rev. UCC § 9-617(a). By contrast, a
senior security interest normally rides through the foreclosure.
Under subsection (b), a good-faith transferee takes free of all but
the senior lien even if the procedures surrounding the foreclosure
sale are faulty. The revision applies a good-faith standard to both
public and private dispositions, whereas current UCC § 9-504(4)
imposes a somewhat different standard for public foreclosure
sales.
Rev. UCC § 9-619, which is new, provides a handy proce-
dure under which foreclosure buyers of motor vehicles covered
by a certificate of title can obtain a transfer statement to obtain
clear legal title to the motor vehicle. Under current law, obtaining
a clear chain of title can be accomplished only with the consent of
the record owner. If the record owner is the debtor after default
and refuses to cooperate, the secured party may have great diffi-
culty in obtaining a repo title and disposing of the collateral. The
title-clearing mechanism of the transfer statement should solve
this problem, not only for titled motor vehicles but also for other
types of collateral where the law does not provide such a mecha-
nism.
0. Facilitation of Strict Foreclosure
In some of its most important reforms, the revision encour-
ages the use of strict foreclosure, that is, retaining the collateral in
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satisfaction of the debt. This enforcement mechanism is encour-
aged because in many cases a foreclosure sale is futile where a
deficiency claim is worthless, or the expenses and legal risks of a
sale are such that strict foreclosure is commercially preferable.
For a statement of this policy of encouraging strict foreclosure,
see Rev. UCC § 9-620, Comment 2.
The revision encourages strict foreclosure in at least five
ways:
Although it still allows the secured party the option to
make a proposal to the debtor inviting a response, the secured
party may simply accept collateral in satisfaction of the debt if
the debtor consents or the secured party does not receive objec-
tion within 20 days. Under current law, the secured party must
always make a proposal to retain and the debtor has a fixed pe-
riod to respond. Allowing the acceptance option without a for-
mal proposal eliminates an element of awkwardness under
current law. The debtor may consent by agreeing to the accep-
tance in writing after default. Rev. UCC §§ 9-620, 9-621.
Rev. UCC § 9-620(a) permits a secured party in noncon-
sumer foreclosures to accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the
debt, something that probably cannot be done under current law.
Rev. UCC § 9-620 eliminates the requirement under cur-
rent law that the secured party use strict foreclosure only when it
is in possession of the collateral, at least in nonconsumer foreclo-
sures. This means that the remedy may be used in foreclosing on
intangible collateral, an unlikely result under current law. See
Comment 7.
Rev. UCC §9-622 provides that acceptance of the collateral
in satisfaction of the debt discharges junior claimants, a result
unlikely under current law.
The revision rejects the holdings of some courts under
current law that a creditor is barred from obtaining a deficiency if
it holds collateral too long and thus engages in a constructive
strict foreclosure. Instead, delay is a factor relating to whether the
secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner under
Rev. UCC §§ 9-607 and 9-610. See Rev. UCC § 9-620, Comment 5.
On a related point, the debtor's voluntary surrender of collateral
to the secured party and the secured party's acceptance of the re-
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
turn do not, of themselves, raise an implication that the secured
party intends or is proposing to accept the collateral in satisfac-
tion of the secured debt.
P. Sanctions for Creditor Misbehavior
As under current law, if it is established that the secured
party is violating the rules of Article 9 in enforcement of its secu-
rity interest, a court may enjoin further enforcement (Rev. UCC
§ 9-625(a)), or subject the creditor to liability for damages (Rev.
UCC § 9-625(b)). For example, if the creditor prematurely under-
takes repossession when the debtor is not in default, the repo
could be enjoined or the debtor could collect monetary damages.
The drafters also suggest that, in a proper case, the secured party
might be liable for conversion under non-UCC law-possibly re-
sulting in punitive damages and attorney fees. See Rev. UCC § 9-
626, Comment 2.
As a measure of protection for foreclosing secured parties,
Rev. UCC § 9-627 continues current law in providing that low
price alone is not enough to make a foreclosure sale commercially
unreasonable. Except in situations covered by the Rapson rule of
Rev. UCC § 9-615(f), the key continues to be procedural irregularihy
in enforcement of the security interest. Moreover, a disposition of
collateral is performed in a commercially reasonable manner if
made: (1) in the usual manner on any recognized market; (2) at
the price current in any recognized market at the time of disposi-
tion; or (3) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial
practices among dealers in the type of property that was the sub-
ject of the disposition. Rev. UCC § 9-627(b). Subsection (c) of Rev.
UCC § 9-627 provides that a collection, enforcement disposition,
or strict foreclosure is commercially reasonable if it has been ap-
proved: (1) in a judicial proceeding; (2) in a bona fide creditors'
committee; (3) by a representative of creditors; or (4) by an as-
signee for the benefit of creditors. These safe harbors are an
elaboration of current law.
What is the effect of creditor misbehavior on a deficiency
claim? For nonconsumer transactions, the revision adopts the re-
buttable presumption rule for creditor misbehavior during fore-
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closure. Rev. UCC § 9-626. Under this rule, the value of the col-
lateral is deemed to equal the unpaid balance of the debt, unless
the creditor proves otherwise. The burden is shifted to the credi-
tor seeking a deficiency to show that it deserves one; and it must
come forth with evidence of collateral value independent of the
price obtained on foreclosure. By embracing the rebuttable pre-
sumption rule, the revision rejects the absolute bar rule under
which the misbehaving creditor's claim to a deficiency is snuffed
out regardless of harm caused by the misbehavior during fore-
closure. Under current law, most states have chosen the rebut-
table presumption rule, but a fair number take the more
Draconian absolute bar approach. Not surprisingly, the rebut-
table presumption rule was one of the most sought-after changes
by secured creditor groups during the revision process. The rule
eliminates unfortunate situations where the misbehaving creditor
is denied a multimillion dollar deficiency against the borrower
and guarantor because of some technical failure in holding a
foreclosure sale on a $50,000 piece of equipment. See, for exam-
ple, In re Kirkland.'3
13. In re Kirkland, 915 F2d 1236,12 UCC Rep. 2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1990).
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